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The present study applies a new method for investigating dynamic unconscious pro- 
cesses. The method consists of (1) selection of words from patient interview and test 
protocols that in the clinicians’ judgments capture the patients’ conscious symptom 
experience (i.e., phobia) and the hypothetical unconscious conflict related to the symp- 
tom, (2) subliminal and supraliminal presentation of these words, (3) signal analysis of 
event-related potentials (ERPs) obtained to the word presentations. Eight phobics and 
three patients suffering from pathological grief reactions served as subjects. A time- 
frequency (Williams & Joeng, 1989) ERP analysis revealed that subjects’ ERPs classified 
the unconscious conflict words better subliminally than supraliminally, while the reverse 
was true for the conscious symptom words (r(20) = 2.82, p = ,011). The relationship 
between frequency and latency revealed a similar mirror image pattern for the uncon- 
scious conflict and conscious symptom words (F(4136) = 4.14, p = .007). This method 
demonstrated that objective, brain-based evidence for unconscious conflict can be ob- 
tained. 0 1992 Academic Press, Inc. 
INTRODUCTION 
As psychology has broadened its interest from the study of overtly observable 
behavior to include the role of consciousness, it has become apparent that con- 
sciousness itself cannot be understood without positing the existence of uncon- 
scious processes (Shevrin & Dickman, 1980; Kihlstrom, 1984, 1987). At present 
there are two views of the nature of these unconscious processes: cognitive and 
dynamic. The cognitive perspective stresses the role of unconscious computa- 
tional and associative processes in perception, memory, judgment, and attention 
as general psychological functions. Psychoanalysis stresses the role of uncon- 
scious affective and motivational forces in a state of conflict varying as a function 
of personal history and the nature of defensive organization. These views, al- 
though different in emphasis, can be seen as complementary. 
In a paper exploring the implications of this shift from an interest in overt 
behavior to the investigation of unconscious processes, Shevrin and Dickman 
(1980) advanced three propositions: (1) The initial stage for all stimuli occurs 
outside of consciousness, (2) this initial stage outside of consciousness is psycho- 
logical in nature, is active in its effect on consciousness, and can be different 
’ To whom reprint requests should be addressed at University of Michigan Medical Center, Depart- 
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from conscious experience in its principles of operation, (3) consciousness of a 
stimulus is a later and optional stage. 
These propositions led to specifying three factors that determine the emergence 
of a stimulus into consciousness: (1) Stimulus factors (e.g., loudness, brightness, 
figural coherence, meaning, etc.), (2) state factors (e.g., positive interest, level of 
arousal, sleep stage, fatigue, distractibility, etc.), (3) motivational factors (e.g., 
avoidance of anxiety, guilt, conflict, interest, etc.). Cognitive research has mainly 
dealt with the role of stimulus factors in unconscious processing, including promi- 
nently stimulus meaning as in the use of words and pictures. Research within a 
psychoanalytic frame of reference has concentrated on the third set of factors- 
affect, defensive organization, motivation, and conflict. Interestingly, very little 
research has been done on state factors (however, see Shevrin & Fisher, 1967; 
Stross & Shevrin, 1967; Castaldo & Shevrin, 1970). 
THE ROLE OF SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION 
As unconscious processes have become of increasing interest to psychology, 
the use of subliminal stimuli has more and more frequently been used to investi- 
gate the nature of processes outside of awareness (see Dixon, 1971, 1981). It is 
of interest to note in light of the research to be described below that the use of 
subliminal stimuli as a means of investigating unconscious processes was intro- 
duced into contemporary psychology by a group of psychoanalytically oriented 
researchers, beginning with Fisher’s pioneering contributions in the fifties 
(Fisher, 1954, 1956, 1957). Shortly thereafter, Dixon in England followed Fisher’s 
lead (Dixon, 1956, 1958a,b), as did researchers at the Research Center for Mental 
Health at New York University (Klein, Spence, Holt, & Gourevitch 1958; Klein 
& Holt, 1960; Eagle, 1959; Eagle, Wolitzky, & Klein, 1966; Pine, 1960, 1961; 
Spence, 1961, 1964) and researchers at the Menninger Foundation (Luborsky & 
Shevrin, 1956; Shevrin & Luborsky, 1958; Stross & Shevrin, 1962, 1967). These 
early studies were criticized by behaviorists such as Goldiamond (1958) and Erik- 
sen (1960) on some of the same methodological grounds as Holender (1986) has 
more recently revived. Erdelyi (1974) and Bowers (1984), among others, have 
responded to critiques of this nature. The senior author has reviewed the work 
of psychoanalytically oriented investigators as they bear on dreaming (Shevrin, 
1986) and repression (Shevrin, 1990) and concluded that these studies succeeded 
in overcoming objections made by critics. (For earlier reviews of this literature 
see Dixon, 1971, 1981.) In more recent years, within a psychoanalytic frame of 
reference, the Silverman Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation (SPA) method 
has generated considerable research (see Balay & Shevrin, 1988, for a critical 
evaluation of this body of work.) 
Starting in the mid- to late seventies with the work of Marcel (1975, 1983), in 
particular, cognitive psychologists became interested in using subliminal stimuli 
in research on perception and memory. This body of research has concentrated 
primarily on demonstrating that semantic processing can occur outside of aware- 
ness. Unlike the psychoanalytically oriented researchers, who relied mainly on 
energy masking to render stimuli subliminal, cognitive investigators have relied 
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primarily on backward pattern masking.’ This method has not been without its 
critics (see Holender, 1986), who have raised the objection that the conditions 
under which thresholds were established in these studies differed significantly 
from the conditions under which the experimental effects were obtained and 
were biased in the direction of creating greater consciousness in the experimental 
condition. 
As with Goldiamond’s (1958) and Eriksen’s (1960) earlier objections, critics 
raise one fundamental question: Are subjects conscious of more than they report? 
In response to this criticism, the technology of subliminal perception experiments 
has undergone a significant change in the direction mainly of obtaining many 
more stimulus repetitions, guarding against response bias, and in particular dem- 
onstrating that when the subject is unaware of a stimulus, its effects are different 
from when the subject is aware (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984). This latter criterion 
was referred to by Shevrin and Dickman (1980) as the strong postulate for uncon- 
scious processing. 
THE COGNITIVE AND DYNAMIC UNCONSCIOUS 
The major difference between cognitive and dynamic approaches to the uncon- 
scious concerns the role of affect and motivation. Although there is growing 
interest in the relationship of cognition and affect (Zajonc, 1980; Izard, Kagon, 
& Zajonc, 1984; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988), there is little or no interest in 
defenses, motivation, wishes, desires, and their conflictual interaction, matters 
of central concern to the psychoanalytic conception of the dynamic unconscious. 
However, the psychoanalytic view of the unconscious not only includes a con- 
cern with defenses, affect, motivation, and conflict, but is also concerned with 
the way in which dynamic unconscious processes are organized, or the qualitative 
differences between conscious and unconscious processing summarized theoreti- 
cally as the differences between the primary and the secondary process (Freud, 
191111957; Rapaport, 1959). These qualitative differences are not entirely congru- 
ent with the dissociation or disconnection hypotheses offered by Posner and 
Boies (1971) and Marcel (1983). These latter concepts refer to intrinsic differences 
between conscious and unconscious processes of a purely cognitive nature (e.g., 
Posner’s multichannel unconscious activation vs single-channel conscious activa- 
tion; Marcel’s attribution of category ascription solely to consciousness). The 
distinction between primary and secondary processes goes beyond the purely 
’ The relationship between energy masking and pattern masking in subliminal research remains an 
unexplored area. Although Turvey (1973) raised questions about the possibility of central processing 
for energy-masked stimuli, many studies, as reported in Dixon (1971, 1981) and in our own research, 
have produced repeated positive results with energy masking. Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980), using 
the same I-ms exposure condition as in our earlier studies (Shevrin & Fritzler, 1968), reported positive 
findings; several replications of the Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc study employed energy masking also 
with positive results (Seamon, Brody, & Kauff, 1983a; Seamon, Marsh, & Brody, 1984). Seamon, 
Brody, and Kauff (1983b) have used both energy masking and pattern masking in the same experiment 
with positive results, suggesting that at least with respect to the Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc effect the 
two methods are equivalent. Nevertheless, the relationship between the effects produced by pattern 
masking and energy masking requires further examination. 
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cognitive to encompass shifts in activation as a function of defensive needs, 
involving conflict and regression (Rapaport, 1959). 
As an approach to investigating qualitative differences in thought organization 
between conscious and unconscious processes as they might bear on dynamic 
issues, the senior author and co-workers in a series of previous studies employed 
a specially constructed stimulus in the form of a rebus or pictorial representation 
of a word (Shevrin & Luborsky, 1961; Shevrin & Fritzler, 1968a; Shevrin, 1973). 
The rebus was a picture of a pen and a knee making up the word “penny.” When 
this stimulus was flashed subliminally at 1 ms, clang or phonetic associations 
(i.e., pennant or neither) and associations to the rebus word (i.e., nickel, dime, 
spend) were more likely to occur than when the same rebus was presented supra- 
liminally at 30 ms. These clang and rebus associations were considered similar 
to the displacements and condensations occurring in dreams and slips that often 
use phonetic rather than semantic links. 
Shevrin and Fisher (1967) demonstrated that subliminal clang and rebus associ- 
ates to the “penny” rebus occurred after wakenings from Stage 1 REM sleep 
and semantic associations (i.e. ink, leg) occurred after wakenings from Stage 2 
NREM sleep and that both effects were greater than those in associations ob- 
tained in the waking state. Stross and Shevrin (1962, 1967) had previously demon- 
strated that hypnosis enhanced semantic subliminal effects, but that a dream was 
necessary to obtain rebus and clang effects. 
Of direct relevance to the research to be reported, these rebus studies demon- 
strated for the first time in the subliminal literature that an event-related potential 
(ERP) could differentiate between two subliminal stimuli (Shevrin & Rennick, 
1967; Shevrin & Fritzler, 1968a,b; Shevrin, Smith, & Fritzler, 1969, 1970, 1972). 
A positive-going ERP amplitude at about 200 ms poststimulus (P,,) differentiated 
between the penny rebus and a dummy mockup of the rebus serving as a control. 
It was also possible to show that clang and rebus associates were correlated with 
bursts of ERP alpha occurring 1 to 2 s after stimulus exposure while the semantic 
effects were positively correlated with the P,, amplitude. Finally, it was found 
that a measure of repressiveness based on the Rorschach correlated negatively 
with the size of this differentiating positive-going ERP component: Subjects scor- 
ing higher on repressiveness appeared to have a smaller ERP component to the 
rebus stimulus and gave fewer stimulus-related associations when it was pre- 
sented subliminally. 
These results, each replicated at least once in the series of studies, and their 
implications have been reviewed by Shevrin (1973). Research done elsewhere has 
also provided independent support for these ERP subliminal findings. Libet, 
Alberts, Wright, and Finestein (1967) have demonstrated that an ERP could 
be detected to a subliminal somatosensory stimulus. Kostandov and Arzumanov 
(1977) have shown that ERPs discriminate between visually presented subliminal 
and supraliminal emotional stimuli. Barkoczi, Sera, and Komlosi (1983) and Bran- 
dies and Lehmann (1986) have shown that ERPs are associated with hemispheric 
differences in processing subliminal visual stimuli. 
However, there was a significant limitation to the rebus studies from a psycho- 
analytic standpoint: Nothing bearing directly on affect, motivation, and conflict 
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was investigated; the closest these studies came to these factors was in the find- 
ings bearing on repressiveness, but these constituted only highly inferential and 
indirect evidence for dynamic factors. No independent evidence for the existence 
of unconscious conflict against which repression was operating was provided. 
Thus, in the next phase of our research we undertook to develop a method that 
would allow us more directly to address defenses, affect, motivation, and conflict. 
THE METHOD 
The method we have developed is based on assessing patients individually so 
that highly personal renderings of hypothesized unconscious conflicts can be 
determined. We intended to draw upon the idiographic nature of clinical data and 
judgment and to use objective laboratory methods to complement the inherent 
subjectivity of clinical work that relies on complex and often unexplicated infer- 
ence chains. Two laboratory-based methods provided this objective complement 
to clinical subjectivity: (1) subliminal and supraliminal exposure of stimuli, and 
(2) ERPs evoked by these stimuli. A signal analysis of ERPs associated with 
subliminal and supraliminal exposures of conflict-related stimuli was intended 
to provide the objective line of evidence converging with subjective clinical 
assessment. 
The method consisted of three components: (1) Clinical assessment and selec- 
tion of key stimuli, (2) subliminal and supraliminal presentation of these key 
stimuli, (3) signal analyses of ERPs obtained to these key stimuli. 
Clinical Assessment 
The psychodynamic formulation. A clinical team made up of three psychoana- 
lysts and a dynamically oriented psychologist conducted the patient assessments. 
One member of the team interviewed the patient and another (the psychologist) 
administrated the tests (WASR, Rorschach, and TAT). The interviews were 
typical unstructured, psychodynamic dialogues in which the patient was given 
the opportunity to talk freely about his/her complaints, relationships (including 
the relationship to the interviewer), and early experiences. Patients were assured 
in advance that in return for participating in the research they would receive a 
thorough evaluation by an experienced clinician and a referral for treatment. 
The interviews and test protocols were audiorecorded and transcribed for 
study. Each clinician was required to examine the transcripts and to arrive at a 
psychodynamic formulation made up of three parts: (a) the patient’s description 
of his/her complaint or presenting symptom, (b) the patient’s understanding of 
this complaint, (c) the underlying unconscious conflict causing the complaint. On 
the basis of this formulation, the clinicians were to select two groups of words 
or brief phrases (not exceeding 17 letters including spaces). The first group cap- 
tured the patient’s conscious experience of his/her complaint (C words). The 
second group reflected the presumed underlying unconscious conflict (U words). 
Two control categories were incorporated drawn from the end points of the evalu- 
ative (pleasant-unpleasant) dimension of the Osgood Semantic Differential re- 
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search (Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975). The selection of the Osgood unpleasant 
(E - ) and pleasant (E + ) words was guided by two considerations: (1) by includ- 
ing unpleasant words it was possible to control for unpleasant affect as such 
which would likely characterize the pathological words; by including E + words 
as a comparison category to the three unpleasant categories, a control for emo- 
tionality would be provided, (2) research by Chapman (1979) had found that it 
was possible to discriminate the extremes of the Osgood dimensions on the basis 
of ERPs. 
In addition to written psychodynamic formulations and word selections, the 
judges met on two occasions to discuss their understanding of the patient. At the 
first of these two meetings, differences were aired and the interviewer instructed 
as to what new information to obtain in a third interview that might resolve these 
differences. 
How the judges worked. It has been one of our primary aims to rely on clinical 
expertise in the word selection process. To depend upon clinical expertise is 
clearly based on the assumption that such expertise, even if not of the same 
objective character as the laboratory methods, nonetheless exists. We consider 
this reliance on expert judgment to be a strength. Often clinical judgments cannot 
be fully formularized and when researchers attempt to substitute an operational 
procedure they usually lose what was valuable in the intuitive process (Bond, 
Hansel, & Shevrin, 1987). At the same time we recognize that clinical judgments 
are made within the context of a theoretical frame of reference, in this instance 
a psychoanalytic frame of reference. But since there are different psychoanalytic 
frames of reference, it should be noted that the particular frame of reference 
shared by the clinical judges is based largely on the structural theory elaborated 
by Arlow and Brenner (1964) and Brenner (1982). 
According to structural theory, symptoms and their underlyng conflicts are 
compromise formations in which id derivatives (or drive factors), ego adaptive 
capacities (including defenses), and superego functions (self-imposed punish- 
ments and rewards) are brought into balance. Thus, a symptom such as a social 
phobia might be the outcome of a wish to exhibit oneself (id derivative), an 
inhibition of this wish so that it is not in consciousness or acted upon (ego de- 
fense), and a withdrawal from social situations so that the wish cannot be satisfied 
(superego punishment or deprivation). The reasons why the wish is inhibited and 
would create a sense of danger and anxiety if admitted into consciousness or 
acted upon relate to the underlying unconscious conflict. 
Our use of psychoanalytic theory draws upon other concepts such as the cen- 
trality of the Oedipus complex, unfolding psychosexual stages of development, 
and the significance of unconscious fantasies. However, our method could as 
easily be used by clinical judges with other theoretical preferences. 
The Delphi method. While wishing to use the strengths inherent in expert clini- 
cal judgments, we also chose to strengthen the expert judgment process through 
use of the Delphi method (Linstone & Turoff, 1975). According to Dalkey, the 
Delphi method includes the following: (1) “The exercise involves a group; (2) the 
goal of the exercise is information, i.e., the exercise is an inquiry; (3) the informa- 
tion being sought is uncertain in the minds of the group; (4) some preformulated 
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systematic procedure is followed in obtaining the group output” (Linstone & 
Turoff, 1975, p. 236). 
Dalkey also identified two basic assumptions of the Delphi method: (a) in situa- 
tions of uncertainty (incomplete information or inadequate theories) expert judg- 
ment can be used as a surrogate for direct knowledge, (b) in a wide variety of 
situations of uncertainty, a group judgment (amalgamating the judgments of a 
group of experts) is preferable to the judgment of a typical member of the group, 
the “n heads are better than one” rule. Thus, our aims in using the Delphi method 
were: (1) to select words on the basis of a corporate or group expert judgment 
as opposed to depending on the judgments of a single expert, and (2) to use a 
“preformulated systematic procedure” in obtaining the corporate judgments, one 
that could be readily understood and replicated by others. 
The word selection procedure. The Delphi method was incorporated into the 
word selection procedure in the following manner (see Table 1 for a summary of 
the word selection procedure): 
(1) Each expert submitted in writing his/her psychodynamic formulation and 
nominated words from the transcripts. 
(2) All the judges’ words were put together in a composite list. 
(3) Each judge rated all the words on how representative they were of the 
conscious symptom and unconscious conflict. 
(4) The judges met as a group to discuss their views of the patient and the 
reasons for their word ratings. These discussions provided feedback the judges 
could then use in their subsequent word ratings. 
(5) In addition to discussion as a group, each judge was provided with complete 
TABLE 1 
Clinical Assessment and Word Selection Procedure 
- 
1. Two interviews and psychodiagnostic tests administered. 
2. First psychodynamic formulations submitted in writing by all judges. 
3. First word selection. 
4. First word ratings of list composed of all judges’ word selections and E + , E - control words. 
5. First Clinical Evaluation Team meeting: discussion of differences, questions for third 
interview. 
6. First psychodynamic formulation consensus summaried and approved by all judges. 
7. Second psychodynamic formulations submitted in writing by all judges. 
8. Second word ratings. 
9. Third interview. 
10. Third psychodynamic formulations submitted in writing by all judges. 
11. Second word selection (from transcript of third interview). 
12. Third word ratings (including additional word selections). 
13. Second Clinical Evaluation Team meeting. 
14. Second and final psychodynamic formulation consensus summaried and approved by all judges. 
15. Fourth and final psychodynamic formulations. 
16. Fourth and final word ratings. 
17. Final word selection for laboratory presentation (including criteria of frequency of usage and 
word length). 
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rating results from the immediately prior ratings so that this too could be used as 
feedback and incorporated into subsequent word ratings. 
(6) Words were rated on four occasions and, on the second through fourth 
ratings, judges received feedback from discussion and/or prior ratings to feed 
forward into their subsequent ratings. 
(7) A mathematical formula developed by Robert Marshall combined all four 
judges’ ratings to determine each word’s ranking on how well it uniquely reflected 
the conscious symptom or unconscious conflict (see Appendix A). This final rank- 
ing contained the judgments of the corporate expert. 
(8) The eight words best reflecting the conscious symptom and eight words best 
reflecting the unconscious conflict were always chosen from among those in the 
top fourth of the final ranking. 
Based on the MYCIN approach developed by Shortliffe (1976), an l&point 
rating scale of category belongingness was used; a score of +9 was assigned to 
words with maximum belongingness to a particular category, a score of -9 was 
assigned to a word with minimal belongingness. The formula is based on the 
assumption that the best conscious symptom word would have an average of +9 
rating in the conscious symptoms category across judges and a rating of -9 in 
the unconscious conflict category across judges. The formula assumes that the 
best unconscious conflict word would receive an average rating of -9 in the 
conscious symptom category and +9 in the unconscious conflict category. 
In addition to the two pathological categories, 49 of the Osgood highly unpleas- 
ant (E -) or highly pleasant (E +) words were added to the composite word list 
and were rated by the judges at the same time as the pathological categories. 
Optimally, E - and E + words would be selected that were unrelated to either 
of the two pathological word categories. They should thus receive a rating of - 9 
with respect to each of the two pathological categories. Eight E - and eight E + 
words were selected. 
In the final step in word selection the four categories were balanced for fre- 
quency of usage for English spoken in psychotherapy sessions (Dahl, 1979) and 
length (see Table 2 for one subject’s words and a summary of the final psychody- 
namic formulation consensus). 
We refer to the four word groups as categories following Medin (1989), who 
has suggested that any category is based on an implicit or explicit theory about 
the relationships constituting the grouping. Thus, it is the patient’s implicit theory 
concerning the nature of the symptom experience that governs the selection of 
words describing the symptom. On the other hand, it is the clinician’s application 
of psychoanalytic structural theory that governs the selection of words constitut- 
ing the unconscious conflict category. The E - and E + categories are presumably 
based on widely held implicit theories as to what constitutes pleasantness and 
unpleasantness. 
The Delphi method should optimize agreement among expert judges and should 
increase the validity of these judgments. If these corporate judgments refer to 
actual psychological events, then we might expect to find convergent evidence 
from the two laboratory-based approaches-subliminal/supraliminal stimulus ex- 
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posure and ERP signal analyses. The expectation of convergence with the two 
laboratory methods is based on previous findings concerning the ability of ERPs 
to discriminate subliminal stimuli. 
In addition to an assessment of unconscious conflict, it would be useful to have 
an independent measure of defensive organization. We chose a well-standardized 
instrument for measuring a personality dimension, hysterical-obsessive, for 
which a reasonable case could be made that the dimension was related to stable 
but different patterns of defenses. The instrument chosen was the Hysteroid- 
Obsessoid Questionnaire (HOQ) (Caine & Hawkins, 1963; Caine & Hope, 1967). 
We reasoned that hysteria would be associated with a repressive-avoidant pat- 
tern of defenses; obsessionality with an obsessive-intellectualizing pattern of 
defenses. A number of studies have successfully assessed these stylistic attributes 
relying mainly on the Rorschach (Schafer, 1954; Shapiro, 1965; Luborsky, Bin- 
der, & Schimek, 1965; Shevrin et al., 1969; Smokler & Shevrin, 1979). Ludolph 
(1981) has reported a significant positive correlation (.70, p < .05) between the 
HOQ and Rorschach based on judgments of hysteroid and obsessoid styles. A 
high score on the HOQ indicates an hysterical personality organization and a low 
score an obsessional personality organization. 
SubliminallSupraliminal Laboratory Procedure 
The 32 words making up the four categories selected by the clinicians were 
presented in a Gerbrand Model T-3A 3-field Dodge-type tachistoscope with field 
brightness as measured at the eye-piece and surrounding room set at 10.0 ft/ 
lamberts; displays were tested for steady-state and pulse brightness to verify 
equivalence of the fixation and stimulus fields. The 32 words were presented in 
six randomized blocks for 1 ms (subliminal condition) and then at either 30 or 40 
ms (supraliminal condition) depending on the duration at which the subject could 
clearly report seeing the words, determined by presenting two neutral words 
before the experiment began, first at 30 and then at 40 ms. The 8 words in each 
category were presented 6 times for a total of 48 presentations of each category 
for each of the two durations. Words were printed on 4 x 6 cards in Helvetica 
light 18point type. The white background had approximately four times the re- 
flectance of the black-lettered words. The stimulus cards were numerically coded 
so that the assistant presenting the words did not know what they were. Sublimi- 
nality was confirmed by a discrimination series of 40 stimuli presented in the form 
of 20 paired comparisons at the end of the experiment flashed under the same 
subliminal condition as during the experiment. Subjects could not discriminate 
between same and different word pairs, blank pairs, or word/blank pairs at better 
than chance levels (50%). We have also presented two E + and two E - words 
under the same subliminal condition for a total of 120 times for each word in a 
forced-choice paradigm to 35 subjects. Subjects’ guesses were consistently at 
chance levels (Snodgrass, Shevrin, & Kopka, in preparation). 
ERP Measures. ERPs were derived from three electrode placements with refer- 
ence to linked ears: P3, P,, and a special placement one-third of the distance from 
C, to P, (C,P,) found in previous research to provide data discriminating between 
E- and E+ word categories (Chapman, 1979). Silver-silver chloride disc elec- 














































Note. Stimulus words of subject 7, a 20-year-old male suffering from a public eating phobia. The 
conscious symptom (C) words were all drawn from his answers to interview questions about his 
experiences while eating in public. The unconscious conflict (U) words were drawn from the subject’s 
interviews and test responses which, in the clinicians’ diagnostic judgment, reflect an underlying 
unconscious conflict with men over dominance and submission that was hypothesized to be related 
to his phobia. The E- and E+ words were drawn from the end points of the Osgood evaluative 
dimension and have been judged to be unrelated to the C and U words. The four word categories 
were balanced for length and frequency of usage. 
trodes were used; impedance was below 5 KCI; an electrode at the left mastoid 
served as ground. Data were collected using a 130-ms prestimulus period and 
continued for approximately 1 s. Electrode signals were amplified and monitored 
using a 24-channel Grass Model 8 EEG. Signals contaminated with eye move- 
ments, muscle, eye blinks, or alpha waves were rejected either manually or, as 
in the case of alpha waves, automatically by the computer and were replaced 
immediately. Gain and bandwidth were set at 7 kv/mm and from 1 to 70 Hz, 
respectively. Data were sampled at 250 Hz, using an HP 1000 computer system. 
All individual ERPs were preserved in disk files for subsequent processing. 
SUBJECTS 
The most suitable subjects for our research would be patients who were clearly 
within the neurotic range and suffering from fairly discrete ego-dystonic symp- 
toms sufficiently discomfitting to motivate them to seek treatment. We decided 
that patients with phobias and pathological grief reactions would meet these crite- 
ria. Eleven such subjects have completed the experiment. Of these, eight suffered 
from phobias (six from social phobias, one with a blood phobia, and one with an 
agoraphobia), and three suffered from pathological grief reactions.3 Seven sub- 
3 Of the eight subjects suffering from phobias, six met DSM-III-R criteria for Social Phobia (300.23), 
one, a blood phobic, met criteria for Simple Phobia (300.29), and one met criteria for Panic Disorder 
with agoraphobia (300.21). In the ICD-9 diagnostic classification system, all these subjects would 
meet criteria for Neurotic Disorder, phobic state (300.2). The three subjects judged to have been 
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jects were men and four were women. All subjects were right-handed and were 
tested for normal eyesight, if necessary corrected by glasses. No subject reported 
previous head injuries, psychiatric hospitalizations, or neurological disorders. 
With one exception, they were all in their twenties and thirties (one woman was 
in her early forties). Subjects were informed beforehand that the laboratory team 
knew nothing about their difficulties, other than that they had a psychiatric com- 
plaint. Subjects were also told that they could stop the laboratory session at any 
time and ask to speak to the research director (HS). It was explained to the 
subjects that they would at times see words that were familiar to them and that 
at times it might be hard for them to see any words. The laboratory session 
usually lasted from 3 to 4 h and was scheduled within a week of completing the 
clinical assessment. All subjects were referrals from various agencies, such as 
the University Student Health Service, Outpatient Clinics, etc. 
RESULTS 
ERP Signal Analysis 
ERPs can be described in terms of frequencies, amplitudes, latencies, and 
scalp distributions (Allison, Wood, & McCarthy, 1986). In a previous report 
(Shevrin, 1988), a measure based on a Shannon information-theoretic approach 
was used in which ERP information properties were measured (Williams, She- 
vrin, & Marshall, 1987). This measure differentiated the two pathological catego- 
ries (C and U words) from the two control categories (E+ and E-), but failed 
to differentiate fully the two pathological categories from each other. A new 
approach was devised that made it possible to analyze the ERPs into discrete 
time-frequency (t-f) features (Choi, Williams, & Zaveri, 1987; Choi & Willilams, 
1989; Williams & Jeong, 1989). 
Traditional analyses of brain signals, such as the EEG and the ERP, have relied 
on amplitude peaks in the time series (e.g., P& or frequency components (e.g., 
alpha band). For time-varying signals such as the EEG or ERP it is often desirable 
to know more precisely how their frequency components change with time (Co- 
hen, 1989). This result can be achieved by establishing their joint time-frequency 
distributions (Williams & Jeong, 1989). Musical notation is one such centuries-old 
representation of a time-frequency distribution. Each note represents the pitch 
(frequency) of a sound and its duration. Complex musical pieces consist of many 
notes with distinct pitches and durations. The trained ear is capable of abstracting 
these complex relationships. Efforts to devise more mathematically precise time- 
suffering from pathological grief reactions were more difficult to fit into diagnostic categories. To the 
extent that they all shared an abnormal reaction to the death of a close relative, they would qualify 
as suffering from an adjustment disorder; according to DSM-III-R, however, in each instance the 
disorder lasted more than 6 months and thus would fail to meet one important DSM-III-R criterion 
for adjustment disorder, nor would they meet criteria for Uncomplicated Bereavement (V62.82). In 
all three cases, the main Axis I diagnosis was Dysthymia (300.40). In the ICD-9 diagnostic classifica- 
tion system, these subjects would meet criteria for Adjustment Reaction, prolonged depressive reac- 
tion (309.1). 
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frequency relationships have been crude by comparison. These approaches have 
assumed that a tone persists for a certain length of time in order for its frequency 
to be determined exactly. For example, the spectrogram and sonogram are based 
on the assumption that the signal remains stationary for a time in order for time- 
frequency relationships to be determined. These methods require that a window 
of fixed duration be moved along the signal so the frequencies of the tones lying 
within the window can be measured. Any variation in the frequency of a compo- 
nent within the window produces a confusing result. The method described by 
Williams and co-workers (Choi et al., 1987; Williams & Jeong, 1989) allows for 
high-resolution descriptions of the time-frequency components of a signal. Using 
this method, one can now identify precise time-frequency components thus uni- 
fying the previous dichotomy between time and frequency and making possible 
a much more accurate identification of time-varying features. This method sur- 
passes in precision the amplitude components (e.g., P,,) used in our previous 
research. A preliminary account of the application of this new approach to some 
of our data has been presented elsewhere (Shevrin, Williams, Marshall, Hertel, 
Bond, & Brakel, 1988). A brief mathematical account of this method is provided 
in Appendix B. 
On the basis of this new time-frequency analysis the C, U, and E - categories 
were each compared in a discriminant analysis with the E + category that served 
as a control or placebo condition. The categories within a pair (e.g., U vs E +) 
were divided into development and test sets, with the odd presentations (1,3,5) 
and even presentations (2,4,6) serving alternately as development and test sets. 
Thus, the 48 ERPs constituting the odd presentations for the U and E + category 
pair (24 from each category) were analyzed into their differentiating t-f features 
and the first 40 of these features were rank ordered in information units (bits) 
according to their ability to differentiate the two categories (Williams et al., 1987). 
Features were next combined into clusters of increasing size (2,3,4 . . . 19 fea- 
tures) based on a patterning principle: each feature added was selected to max- 
imize the cluster’s capacity to differentiate within category pairs, regardless of 
original information ranking. According to accepted criteria for pattern recogni- 
tion, with 24 members in a subset (half the data in a set of 48) a cluster of 
five time-frequency features should provide maximal capacity for differentiating 
categories (Devijver & Kittler, 1982). 
Once these feature clusters had been selected for the development set (odd or 
even), these same features were then applied independently to the test set for 
validation. Since the actual stimulus was known in each case, a 2 x 2 contingency 
table could easily be constructed for the hits and misses. Chance classification of 
the test data would be 50%. A percentage correct classification score for each 
subject for each duration and category was entered into the statistical analyses. 
We sought to answer one main question: Would the t-f features differentiate 
the two clinically selected pathological word categories depending on whether 
the words had been presented subliminally or supraliminally? In order to answer 
this question we planned three contrasts. The first planned contrast reflects our 
particular interest in whether the U and C categories would differ from each other 
in percentage correct classification as a function of duration. The remaining two 
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contrasts compare the U and C categories separately across durations. In statisti- 
cal terms, the null hypotheses for the three contrasts would be expressed as: 
la cUsub - &q,) -(Csub - csup) = o 
2* tUsub - Usup) = 0 
3. (Csub - Csup) = 0 
Statistical analyses and findings. The t-f discriminant analysis was performed 
on data obtained from electrodes C,P,, P,, and Pd. The t-f feature analysis also 
made it possible to combine electrode pairs of special interest in the form of 
cross-energy, t-f density distributions (see Appendix B for the mathematical deri- 
vation of these distributions). Insofar as our stimuli were words, we were particu- 
larly interested in the contribution of the left hemisphere as compared to the right 
hemisphere. For this reason we added P, and P, separately to the C,P, placement 
found by Chapman (1979) to differentiate between the E - and the E + categories. 
By combining C,P, with P, and P4, respectively, we attempted to take advantage 
of any commonality between a more central and a lateralized electrode. 
Multivariate analyses of the percentage correct classification scores revealed 
that it was the C,P,/P, electrode pair for which a significant category by duration 
interaction was present: F(2/20) = 3.82, p = .039. For the first planned contrast 
the difference in percentage correct classification between subliminal and suprali- 
minal durations for the C and U categories was significant: t(20) = 2.82, p = 
.Ol 1 .4 The average difference betwen subliminal and supraliminal durations for 
the U words was 5.92% in favor of the subliminal duration (54.78% vs 49.04%) 
and -2.65% in the opposite direction in favor of the supraliminal condition for 
the C words (48.33% vs 50.99%). It was this difference that was statistically 
significant.5 The t-f features more correctly classified the U words subliminally 
and the C words supraliminally . 
For the second planned contrast in which the U words were compared across 
durations, percentage correct classification was significantly higher subliminally 
than supraliminally: t(20) = 2.79, p < .014. 
For the third planned contrast in which the C words were compared across 
durations, the percentage correct classification was not significantly different t(20) 
= - 1.25, p > .lO. 
In post-hoc testing no significant differences appeared for contrasts involving 
the E- words.6 
4 The error term for this contrast is the interaction error mean square with 20 degrees of freedom. 
As Keppel (1982) has pointed out, the interaction mean square is appropriate for use in calculating 
this interaction contrast unless there were reason to suspect heterogeneity of within-cell variances 
that is not here the case. These same considerations apply to calculating the appropriate significance 
levels for the other two planned contrasts. For the three planned contrasts, significance levels had to 
be less than ,017 (Sidak correction set at .05). 
’ Classification results using the development/test method of validation are highly conservative and 
represent a lower bound on the true performance of the method. If above chance results are obtained, 
it is highly likely that the true performance of the method would be considerably better given a much 
larger set of data for development and testing. 
6 Chapman (1979), using hundreds of stimulus repetitions presented supraliminally, was able on the 
basis of a principal component discriminant analysis to classify E+ and E- words significantly 
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Because of the contribution of hemisphere to our results, percentage correct 
classification scores were correlated between C,P,/P, and C,P,/P,. For the U 
words only, a significant negative correlation was found for the subliminal condi- 
tion (- .63, p < .05). The correlation for the supraliminal condition was .40 (ns). 
When the diffeerence between the subliminal and the supraliminal correct classifi- 
cation scores were correlated across hemispheres (high score in favor of the 
subliminal condition), the correlation for the U category words was - .70 (p < 
.05), and nonsignificant for the C and E- categories (.30 and .05, respectively). 
How might relationships between frequency and latency in the five t-f feature 
cluster account for these correct classification results? Analyses were pursued 
only for the C,P,/P, electrode pair. Inspection revealed that there were consider- 
able individual differences in frequency and latency across durations within cate- 
gories. It was thus decided for the purpose of this exploratory analysis to compare 
the latencies of the lowest and highest frequencies for each subject within catego- 
ries and durations and to perform a MANOVA on these data with the two latenc- 
ies serving as dependent variables. 
In determining the relationship between the two latencies the MANOVA pro- 
gram automatically seeks out the linear combination of the two dependent vari- 
ables which maximizes the differences among the six category by duration cells. 
In this instance the raw discriminate function coefficients were .00687 for the 
highest frequency latency and - .00561 for the lowest frequency latency. The 
contributions of the highest and lowest frequency latencies were of approximately 
equal magnitude but in opposite directions. Not surprisingly a significant category 
by duration interaction was found: F(4/36) = 4.14, p = .007, Hotellings test. 
Post-hoc Hotelling T2 contrasts were computed using a power correction sug- 
gested by Stevens (1986). Three significant contrasts emerged: (1) between sub- 
liminal and supraliminal U words: T2(2/9) = 15.51, p < .OlO; (2) between sublimi- 
nal and supraliminal C words: T* (2/9) = 7.23, p < .013; (3) between subliminal 
C and U words: T* (2/9) = 7.69, p < .Oll. No significant differences were found 
for the E- category. 
The direction of these differences revealed that for the U and C words mirror- 
image reversals between latency and frequency occurred as a function of duration 
that paralleled the direction of the correct classification results. For the sublimi- 
nal U words the highest frequency had the shortest latency, while the reverse 
was true for the subliminal C words. For the supraliminal U words the lowest 
frequency now had the shortest latency, while the reverse was true for the suprali- 
minal C words. These interactions are displayed in Fig. 1. 
better than chance. With the same electrode placement, C,P,, and relying solely on the supraliminal 
presentations, we failed to replicate Chapman’s finding for the E- and E+ words. However, it is 
important to take note of several significant differences in our procedure. We employed far fewer 
stimulus repetitions, the E- and E+ words were embedded in entirely different verbal contexts 
(other Osgood dimension words versus personally meaningful words), and a different type of ERP 
analysis (principal component versus time-frequency features). These substantial differences may 
account for our failure to replicate Chapman’s findings. 
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FIG. 1. Relationship between latency and duration for highest and lowest frequencies by word 
category. (Left) Unconscious conflict words (U); (middle) conscious symptom words (C); (right) 
Osgood unpleasant words (E-). Numbers in parentheses are the frequency averages. 
If dynamic unconscious processes were involved, we would expect personality 
and defensive organization to play some role in the differences found between the 
U and the C categories for percentage classification success and the relationships 
between frequency and latency. HOQ scores were available for 8 of the 11 sub- 
jects; 2 subjects were not administered the HOQ through an oversight and 1 
subject refused to take the test. When the percentage correct classification differ- 
ence scores between the subliminal and the supraliminal durations (high score in 
favor of subliminal condition) were correlated with the HOQ score for the U 
category, the correlation was .77 (p < .05). For the C and E- categories, the 
correlations were nonsignificant (.16 and - .24, respectively). The hysteroid- 
repressive subjects more correctly classified the words related to their uncon- 
scious conflicts subliminally than supraliminally. Consistent with repression, 
these results could be interpreted to mean that the hysteroid-repressive subjects 
knew unconsciously what they had to remain unaware of consciously. 
When we obtained correlations between the HOQ and the highest and lowest 
frequencies, we again found that for the U words there was a substantial tendency 
for the correlations to be in opposite directions in the subliminal condition. For 
the highest frequency the correlation was .71 (p < .OS), while for the lowest 
frequency the correlation was - .55 (ns). When the difference between high and 
low frequencies for a given subject was correlated with the HOQ scores, the 
correlation for the U category in the subliminal condition was .81 (p < .05). The 
only other significant correlation was a correlation of - .83 (p < .05) between 
the highest frequency for the E - category and the HOQ in the subliminal condi- 
tion. This correlation was in the opposite direction from the one obtained for the 
U words (.71 versus - .83). With respect to latency of the lowest frequency 
feature, fairly large correlations in opposite directions were found for the C words 
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(subliminal condition: - .95, p < .Ol; supraliminal condition: .70, p < .lO). It is 
again notable how correlations tend to go in opposite directions as a function of 
duration and category. Overall, these findings involving the HOQ suggest that 
personality and defensive organization do indeed play a role in the effects we 
have been investigating. 
DISCUSSION 
Our findings support the claim that the dynamic unconscious can be investi- 
gated on the basis of a convergent method in which objective laboratory-based 
measures complement the subjective, intuitive, theory-rich inferences of the psy- 
choanalytic clinician. The method is an approximation to the physician’s reliance 
on laboratory pathology findings to provide objective evidence for a clinically 
based diagnosis. Unlike the laboratory pathology findings, however, our laborato- 
ry-based methods cannot be viewed as the final arbiter; negative results from 
the laboratory need not be interpreted as disproving the clinical hypotheses, 
but simply as not providing support-perhaps other laboratory-based measures 
would. However, positive findings are significant insofar as they demonstrate that 
the C and U pathological word categories as selected by the clinicians differ 
in the way in which the brain responds to them. Moreover, these differences 
support the further claim that the relative failure of t-f ERP features to classify 
the unconscious conflict words correctly when they were presented supralimi- 
nally even though they had been correctly classified subliminally point to defen- 
sive activity occurring when these words were presented supraliminally. This is 
given additional support by the significant correlation between the percentage 
correct classification difference scores and the HOQ for the U category: The 
more hysteroid-repressive the subject, the greater the superiority of correct clas- 
sification subliminally compared to supraliminally for the unconscious conflict 
words. 
The way in which the findings differ depending on duration satisfies a criterion 
for establishing subliminal effects advocated by Cheesman and Merikle (1984), 
who have suggested that qualitative differences between conscious and uncon- 
scious measures provide powerful methodological support for the existence of 
subliminal effects. We would add further that these qualitative differences appear 
most strongly for stimuli related to unconscious conflict and thus underscore 
the importance of the dynamic unconscious. Had we relied solely on ordinary 
unpleasant words (E - ) or even words related to the conscious experience of the 
symptom, no such differences would have emerged. The earlier rebus studies had 
shown that ERP parameters (P,,; ERP alpha) were correlated with differences 
in the qualitative nature of association processes (semantic versus phonic) de- 
pending on whether the stimuli had been presented subliminally or supraliminally; 
but these results did not speak to the role of unconscious conflict. Our present 
results, however, show that the content of unconscious conflict elicits different 
brain responses at an unconscious (subliminal) level than at a conscious (suprali- 
minal) level. It remains to be seen if differences in the nature of associations and 
in the content of unconscious conflict can be explored in one study in order 
356 SHEVRIN ET AL. 
to investigate the psychoanalytic hypothesis that thought processes involving 
unconscious conflict are organized on the basis of a principle (primary process) 
different from that of conflict-free thought organization (secondary process), thus 
shedding light on both the cognitive and the dynamic unconscious. 
Our results were found for the electrode pair C,P,/P,, but were not found for 
C,P,, C,P,/P,, P,, and Pd. Factors shared by the left hemisphere and a more 
centrally placed electrode (C,P,) accounted for the outcome. The left hemisphere 
is generally considered to be involved in sequential, linguistic processing, while 
the right hemisphere is engaged more in spatial, configurational processing. Our 
stimuli are words and thus would favor left hemisphere processing. The HOQ 
findings with respect to percentage correct classification would be consistent with 
this interpretation: Repression is directed primarily against verbal, ideational rep- 
resentatives or derivatives of unacceptable wishes, rather than at the concrete 
affective qualities associated with them. Thus, an hysterical patient might blush 
at a sexual reference but not recall its actual content. Similarly, in split-brain 
patients, Sperry has reported as noted by Galin (1974) that when a nude figure is 
presented to the right hemisphere, the patient will blush but not know what they 
are blushing about. It is inviting to hypothesize that repression acts like a func- 
tional splitting of the hemispheres. 
These left hemisphere results do not fit, however, with the Galin hypothesis 
that unconscious processes are mainly to be found in the right hemisphere (Galin, 
1974). Rather, our results suggest that unconscious processes may also be found 
for left hemisphere functions. Our results are consistent with the psychoanalytic 
structural view that defenses draw upon a wide range of normally occurring 
psychological functions, such as verbalization, recall, forgetting, attention, etc. 
(Brenner, 1982; Shevrin & Bond, in press). 
An objection can be raised regarding whether the specific unconscious conflict 
identified by the clinicians is in fact the cause of the symptom. We may have 
identified an unconscious conflict, but our results do not necessarily prove a 
causal connection. This is a sound objection. Perhaps the only way evidence for 
a causal connection can be gathered is in a psychodynamic treatment, during 
which the conflict identified previously emerges and understanding results in 
symptomatic modification. Indeed, Subject 7 (whose words are listed in Table 2) 
was treated psychodynamically for his social phobia and later reevaluated by the 
clinical judges at the end of treatment. They came to the conclusion that the 
anticipated conflict emerged and was to an important extent dealt with and there 
was in fact symptom relief. The results of this and several other treatments of 
our research subjects will be reported elsewhere, including the repetition of labo- 
ratory results (Shevrin, Brakel, Hertel, and Bond, in preparation). 
There are at least three alternate hypotheses that can be offered to account for 
our results: (1) The words selected for the U category may simply be more 
unpleasant for the subject than the C or E- words when compared to the E+ 
category and for some unknown reason very unpleasant words follow the pattern 
of brain responses found, (2) the results are not related to word category as 
described above, but may be the outcome of several powerful affective words, 
(3) the unconscious conflict words may indeed be related to conflict and form a 
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category but are not necessarily unique to that patient; were these words shown 
to other psychiatric patients, they would elicit the same pattern of findings. Or, 
more generally, there may simply be something about the unconscious conflict 
words, exactly what remains to be determined, that would elicit the same pattern 
of findings in anyone. 
In response to the first hypothesis, we can report that subject ratings on the 
Osgood evaluative dimension collected after the laboratory procedure was com- 
pleted showed no difference in unpleasantness between the C and the U words. 
Indeed, there were usually one or two U category words that had consciously 
positive affect, such as the word John for Subject 7. It was only unconsciously 
that John was hypothesized to elicit negative feelings, while consciously the sub- 
ject considered him to be a close friend. Also, this alternative hypothesis would 
be hard pressed to account for the actual pattern of findings, while the psychoana- 
lytic hypothesis would have little difficulty. 
The second hypothesis is more difficult to answer definitively. We have in 
further analyses tried to see if our categories can be differentiated from pseudo- 
categories made up of two words each from each of the four categories. Presum- 
ably, the pseudo-categories should have no category coherence because they are 
made up equally of words from the C, U, E - , and E + categories. Results tended 
to support the belief that we were dealing with real categories and not with the 
impact of several powerful words. However, this result is not unequivocal; it 
might still be the case that several words in the real categories, not present in the 
pseudo-categories, carried the effect. A word-by-word analysis is necessary and 
is currently being performed. 
In response to the third hypothesis, it needs to be noted that the same conflict 
was not found in every patient even when they had the same symptom (e.g., 
social phobia). For this reason it is unlikely that the unconscious conflict words 
would elicit the same pattern of findings in every patient. Although it is logically 
possible that for some unknown reason the unconscious conflict words for a given 
patient would elicit the same pattern of findings in everyone, it is highly unlikely 
given that some of the words could have no meaning at all to anyone other than 
the patient (e.g., John for Subject 7). Although by no means easy to work out, 
the best way to answer this objection would be to add a yoked control subject 
for each experimental subject who would match the experimental subject for 
symptom, age, and sex, but differ in the nature of the unconscious conflict. The 
unconscious words from the experimental subject would be given to the yoked 
subject. The pattern of findings for the unconscious words should be found for 
the experimental subject but not for the yoked subject. 
There is a shortcoming in our design that future research will need to correct. 
We only employed one duration order: subliminahsupraliminal. Our results may 
not generalize to the reverse order. Practical time limitations imposed by our 
method made it difficult to incorporate a balanced design; another comparable 
group of patients would need to have been evaluated and tested in the reverse 
duration order. This work remains for the future. In our current study the words 
were exposed subliminally to subjects in the absence of any prior awareness of 
these particular words. Had we started with the reverse order they would have 
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already been exposed consciously to the words and subliminal results would have 
been more difficult to interpret. Against the background of our current findings, 
however, results with the reverse duration order could be more easily understood. 
For example, if the results were the same, it would strongly suggest that sublimi- 
nal processing is relatively insulated from prior conscious exposure and that the 
same conflict-related words can be responded to differently subliminally and su- 
praliminally, as our present results suggest and clinical experience supports. A 
patient may talk, as in fact our patients did, about their symptoms, dreams, and 
fantasies, employing the very words used in the laboratory without, however, 
being aware of their unconscious significance. 
A word needs to be said about the methodological contribution made by the 
use of subliminal and supraliminal exposures. In effect, subliminal exposure of 
key stimuli is the closest we can come to an operational definition of an uncon- 
scious process. In psychodynamic clinical work we infer the presence of hypothe- 
sized unconscious factors but do not have any coercive, operationally clear evi- 
dence in support of our inferences; nor can we ordinarily obtain evidence of the 
operation of a dynamic unconscious factor, such as unconscious conflict, at the 
time we make our inferences from the presenting material. The senior author has 
argued elsewhere that from a methodological standpoint the unconscious is an 
assumption of the psychodynamic method that cannot be proven by data collected 
with its use (Shevrin, 1984, 1991). The subliminal presentation of words hypothe- 
sized to relate to the unconscious conflict obviates this problem: The words are 
not in consciousness and information about their registration and processing is 
obtained immediately in the form of ERPs. This latter consideration is also of 
importance. Unlike most other subliminal studies, our method does not depend 
on subsequent behavioral responses subject to further interpretation. The signal 
analysis of the ERPs provides us with an independent, nonbehavioral, concurrent 
indicator of the effect of the word categories. There is thus objective evidence 
for the existence in the brain of dynamic, unconscious, conflict-related pro- 
cessing, subject to the possible objections previously discussed. 
The category-differentiating sensitivity of the ERP t-f feature analysis is of 
special interest. First, it must be stressed that this analysis is not the same as an 
EEG frequency analysis in which a fairly wide time window needs to be used in 
order to establish a dominant frequency (see Spydell & Sheer, 1982, for work 
based on this approach in the study of attention). Nor is it the same as a fast 
Fourier transform (FFT) analysis that provides a distribution of all the frequencies 
present in a given EEG episode and their relative power but not their sequence 
in time. Rather, the t-f feature analysis detects specific time-bound instantaneous 
frequencies. Our results suggest that changing patterns of frequencies within rela- 
tively brief time intervals are markers for conscious and unconscious semantic 
processing of stimuli related to affect, symptoms, and conflict. 
Why the particular patterns of low and high frequency latencies were found 
requires further study, but it is an intriguing result. For our present purposes, it 
would not matter what specific ERP parameters were related to the clinically 
selected word categories; the ERP method was used mainly to provide an objec- 
tive, nonbehavioral, and immediate correlate of the word categories. Neverthe- 
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less, the t-f findings may open the door to a uniquely sensitive brain indicator 
of complex processing bearing on the nature of the cognitive and dynamic un- 
conscious. 
It is, however, of some relevance that there is a fast developing neurophysiolog- 
ical literature based on animal studies and relying on implanted electrodes that 
provides intriguing evidence for the important role of precisely timed frequencies 
in brain processes associated with cognitive functioning. Recently Jagadeesh, 
Gray, and Forster (1992) have reported, based on their investigation of the cat 
visual cortex, that “rhythmic firing can be synchronized among cells in wide- 
spread areas of the visual cortex. The visual stimulus condition under which this 
process occurs suggests that the synchronization may contribute to the integra- 
tion of information across broadly displaced parts of the visual field” (p. 252). 
According to this view, parallel and distributed processes in a purely psychologi- 
cal sense may be integrated neurophysiologically on the basis of frequency fea- 
tures, a possibility consistent with our findings. 
Last, although the innovative nature of our method may be conceded, its ulti- 
mate utility can be questioned. For one, it could be pointed out that, although 
statistically significant, the actual magnitudes of the percentage correct classifica- 
tion differences are not very much above chance. For another, out of four analy- 
ses (one for each of the electrodes or combined electrodes) only one, C,P,/P,, 
produced significant results: moreover, these results depended upon a rather 
unique, mathematically derived distribution. Finally, the research procedure itself 
is long, cumbersome, and requires high levels of quite different expertise (e.g., 
psychodynamic, bioelectrical) and many researchers. 
Successful replication would lay to rest at least the first two objections. We 
also recognize that the procedure is demanding and that this might discourage 
replication by others. But it is not unusual in science for the early form of a 
method to be expensive and cumbersome: In biological research the initial stage 
in isolating and synthesizing an important hormone or enzyme may be extremely 
difficult; the earliest computers were massive and inefficient compared to the 
modern desk top PC. But the very isolation of any amount of hormone or the 
very existence of any computer is of theoretical importance. 
There is also some internal evidence that our results may be of greater magni- 
tude than appears to be the case. Intrinsic to our theoretical approach is a multi- 
factorial, interactive model. A symptom is a compromise formation made up of 
interacting id, ego, and superego factors. We have as yet no clear way theoreti- 
cally of knowing how to assign weights to these factors in any given instance: Is 
the symptom caused more by id pressures, superego strictures, or ego weakness? 
We can only try to keep them all in mind. It would thus follow that the extent to 
which we incorporated all these factors, the better and perhaps more substantial 
our results would be. 
An illustration of this point is provided by the results from the HOQ, an instru- 
ment gauging personality factors related to defenses. When we examine the three 
planned contrasts, our findings strongly suggest that where the person falls on the 
hysteroid-obsessoid dimension affects the magnitude of the difference between 
percentage correct classification subliminally and supraliminally. For the first 
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planned contrast in which the U and C words were compared for differences 
between subliminal and supraliminal conditions, we find that for the four most 
hysteroid subjects, the percentage classification difference between subliminal 
and supraliminal U words is 8.98% in favor of the subliminal duration, while for 
the C words the percentage classification difference is -4.45% in the opposite 
direction in favor of the supraliminal condition. For the four least hysteroid sub- 
jects, the two respective percentages are 1.83 and -4.69. The overall effect, the 
difference between the two percentages, for the most hysteroid subjects is 13.43% 
while for the least hysteroid subjects it is 6.51%. The most hysteroid subjects 
demonstrated approximately twice the effect than the least hysteroid subjects. 
For the second planned contrast, the difference for the U words between sublimi- 
nal and supraliminal for the most hysteroid subjects is 8.98% and for the least 
hysteroid subjects it is 1.82%, a factor of approximately 5. Finally, for the third 
planned contrast, the difference between the subliminal and the supraliminal con- 
ditions for the C words is about the same for both high and low hysteroid groups 
(-4.45 and -4.69). 
Our next effort could benefit from more fully incorporating the role of defensive 
organization. Nevertheless, in its current state the method revels new and theo- 
retically relevant phenomena no matter how small in magnitude the effects. 
APPENDIX A: WORD SELECTION ALGORITHMS 
Clinicians should be afforded a readily interpretable set of metrics to measure 
convergence or divergence of opinion on word selections and, at the same time, 
allow for the assessment of relative degrees of belonging and nonbelonging to the 
categories of interest. 
These considerations have led to a technique of quantifying the various aspects 
of the word selection process. “Belonging” is quantified for each word in terms 
of each of the four categories (U, C, E - , E + ) on a scale of + 9 to - 9, thus 
creating a multivariate metric space in which the orthogonal axes are the mea- 
sures of “belonging” for each category. In this manner the joint properties, as 
well as the individual properties, of the words may be analyzed. These rankings 
may also be thought of as measures of “belief” and “disbelief” in the sense 
described by Shortliffe (1976), enabling the modeling of the decision process in 
production rules as in MYCIN. 
Properties of interest in word selection are several but not easily confined in a 
single meaningful metric. An important property is closeness to an ideal category. 
This implies a distance metric and is readily expressed as a Euclidian distance of 
the multivariate word ranking from the ideal ranking, that is, a ranking of +9, 
-9, -9, -9 for a four-category space. Coupled to this property is the distance 
from other categories. Combining these two distances in a single function serves 
to provide a meaningful measure of “closeness” to the ideal ranking and “dis- 
tance” from other categories. In other words, it is a combined or simultaneous 
measure of “belonging” and lack of ambiguity. The most promising measure 
among many available seems to be the mean square distance for the distance 
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metric and a form of likelihood ratio for the function (Sneath & Sokal, 1973). A 
promising function is a product of distance to ideal category and the sum of 
inverse distances to other categories. The following formula has been developed 
to capture these dimensions: 
where 
D, - D,, 
D, = X49 - C,,,,) + (9 + U,,) 
D, = l49 + C,,,,) + (9 - Urn”, 
DC = Category distance of conscious symptom words; 
D” = Category distance of unconscious conflict words; 
C = Mean of conscious symptom word ratings; 
Uy” = Mean of unconscious conflict word ratings. 
APPENDIX B: TIME-FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS 
There are a number of ways of representing the energy present in a signal in 
terms of the relative contributions of the various frequency components at a 
specific time. The spectrogram method commonly used in speech analysis and 
the Wigner distribution are two well-known time-frequency energy distributions 
of Cohen’s Class of Distributions (Cohen, 1989). Cohen’s class of time-frequency 
energy distributions is defined for a signal waveformf(t) to be, for a given kernel 
$ (5, 71, 
This is the energy content of the signalf(t) as a conjoint function of time (t) and 
frequency (w). If two signals, f(t) and g(t), are considered then 
This form reflects the shared or cross-energy distribution between the two signals 
as a function of time and frequency, The well-known Wigner distribution results 
when $(&T) = 1. The Wigner distribution has many desirable characteristics, but 
suffers from the fact that multiple signals produce strong cross-terms as well as 
the individual signal contributions. Although mathematically desirable and cor- 
rect in a theoretical sense, the cross-terms are difficult to interpret visually when 
a plot of the energy surface as a function of time and frequency is viewed. It is 
also difficult to apply pattern recognition techniques in the presence of these 
cross-terms since they result from interactions of significant features in the data 
and are not unique to a given signal component in and of itself. A new distribution 
(termed the Reduced Interference Distribution or RID) obtained by careful design 
of c+(&~) yields a result that retains the contributions of individual signal compo- 
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nents while significantly reducing cross-terms (Choi & Williams, 1989; Williams 
& Jeong, 1989). This has made the pattern recognition and classification approach 
utilized in this report possible. Formulae, incorporating the new RID kernel, were 
used to obtain time-frequency features for signals derived from two electrodes 
(e.g., C,P, and P,, C,P, and P4) (see Eq. (2)). 
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